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De-Sinicization (de + Sinicization) is a process of eliminating or reducing Chinese cultural elements, identity, or consciousness from a society or nation. In modern contexts, it is often used in tandem with decolonization and contrasted to the assimilation process of Sinicization.
Một cái nhìn về các xu hướng ảnh hưởng đến nền kinh tế lớn thứ hai của thế giới
Trung Quốc đang đối mặt với một thách thức kinh tế khi xu hướng "de-sinicization" hay việc loại bỏ hoặc tiêu diệt văn hóa Trung Quốc đang được thực hiện trên chuỗi cung ứng toàn cầu. "Các công ty trên toàn thế giới dự kiến sẽ thay đổi chuỗi cung ứng của họ để ít phụ thuộc hơn vào Trung Quốc sau đại dịch COVID-19," theo một bài báo gần đây trên The Diplomat.
www.rhsmith.umd.edu
Năm 2010, viện nghiên cứu chiến lược Hoa Kì đã đặt ra nhiều vấn đề liên quan mật thiết đến việc: TQ hiện tại đang nắm quá nhiều US assets, quốc hội hoa kì có nhờ hội thinktank của quốc hội nghiên cứu vấn đề này để tìm ra đối sách phù hợp cho TQ, CRS ( Congressional Research Service ) đã trình bày với quốc hội hoa kì các vấn đề trên như sau:
Ai ko hiểu thì tự gg nhé vì t sẽ trích cả đoạn text luôn cho khỏi mất công đứa nào kêu t xạo lz
China-U.S. Trade Issues Wayne M. Morrison Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance July 29, 2010
China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities in the Context of Global Imbalances Many economists argue that concerns over China’s holdings of U.S. securities represent part of a broader problem related to “global imbalances” – the concept that large differences in saving and investment between countries have manifested itself in large trade imbalances. For the U.S. economy, this issue is manifested namely in its low savings rate and thus its dependence on foreign saving to finance its investment needs and federal budget deficits. The large U.S. current account deficit (the manifestation of the high U.S. saving/investment gap) cannot be sustained indefinitely because the U.S. net foreign debt cannot rise faster than GDP indefinitely. The U.S. current account deficit as a percent of GDP fell from a peak of 6.0% in 2006 to 2.7% in 2009 (largely due to the effects of the global economic slowdown). It rose to 3.0% in 2010 and has remained around that level through 2012. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that this figure will fall to 2.9% in 2013, but then will rise over the next five years, reaching 3.5% by 2018 (still significantly below its historical peak).62 In that light, a move by China to a more flexible currency and capital control policy would reduce the Chinese government’s need to purchase U.S. securities (notably, Treasury securities), but could result in greater private Chinese investment in U.S. securities (notably, private securities). Some economists warn that at some point foreign investors may view the growing level of U.S. foreign debt as unsustainable or more risky, or they may no longer view U.S. securities as offering the best return on their investment, and shift investment funds away from U.S. assets, thus forcing U.S. interest rates to rise to attract needed foreign capital. This could result in higher interest rates and lower investment rates, all else equal, which could reduce long-term growth.63 A reliance on foreign governments such as China, to finance the U.S. current account deficit (which includes the U.S. merchandise trade deficit) by increasing their foreign exchange reserves may prolong the necessary adjustment process. Thus, it is argued, the United States must boost its level of savings in the long run in order to reduce its vulnerability to a potential shift away from U.S. assets by foreign investors. It remains to be seen whether this adjustment process began in the United States in 2008, or whether the rise in private saving and decline in the current account deficit was only a temporary response to the recession. Some economists contend that, although the low U.S. savings rate is a problem, the U.S. current account deficit and high levels of foreign capital flows to the United States are also reflections of the strength of the U.S. economy and its attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment, and therefore discount the likelihood that foreign investors will suddenly shift their capital elsewhere.6
Many U.S. policymakers have raised concern over China’s large and growing holdings of U.S. securities, stating that, while such purchases have contributed to the ability of the United States meet its investment needs and have helped fund the growing U.S. federal budget deficit (thus helping to keep real U.S. interest rates low), they could give China increased leverage over the United States on major bilateral political and economic issues.24 In the 111th Congress, H.R. 5319 and S. 3240 would seek to increase the transparency regarding U.S. debt instruments held by foreign governments (including China—the largest foreign holder) to better assess the risks such holdings may have to the United States. Others counter that, given China’s economic dependency on a stable and growing U.S. economy, and its substantial holdings of U.S. securities, any attempt to try to “dump” a large share of those holdings would likely damage both the U.S. and Chinese economies; it would also likely reduce the value of China’s remaining holdings of U.S. dollar assets, and, thus, is not a feasible option for China.
Tóm tắt ý chính thì mấy ông này phân tích là TQ- Hoa Kì quan hệ từ 2009-2010 có sự gắn kết rất bền chặt cả về nợ công quốc gia sở hữu lẫn đầu tư trực tiếp nước ngoài, cho nên là việc TQ bán tháo phần lớn US assets sở hữu sẽ làm thiệt hại cả 2 nền kinh tế Mỹ - Trung, cho nên là viễn cảnh đó khó xảy ra .
Năm 2013, cũng hội think tank đó có suy nghĩ khác như thế này:
China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications for the U.S. Economy
Concerns over China’s Large Holdings of U.S. Securities The growing U.S. dependency on China to purchase U.S. Treasury securities to help fund the U.S. budget deficit has become a major concern to many U.S. policymakers. Some have raised concerns that China’s large holdings may give it leverage over the United States on economic as well as noneconomic issues. Others have expressed concern that China might lose faith in the ability of the United States to meet its debt obligations, and, thus, might seek to liquidate such assets or significantly cut back on purchases of new securities, a move some contend could damage the U.S. economy. Still others contend that China’s purchases of U.S. securities were a major contributing factor to the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis and subsequent global economic slowdown because such purchases helped to keep real U.S. interest rates very low and increased global imbalances. Some warn that similar bubbles could occur in the future if imbalances between the United States and China are not addressed.33 Chinese officials, on the other hand, have expressed concerns over the safety of their large holdings of U.S. debt, and some have argued that China should either diversify away from U.S. Treasury securities or implement policies that slow the accumulation of FX reserves, which would lessen the need to buy U.S. assets.
Some Chinese officials in the past have suggested that its holdings of U.S. debt could be used in regard to economic and political disputes with the United States. To illustrate, an August 7, 2007, article in the Telegraph (an online British newspaper) cited interviews with officials from two leading Chinese government think tanks who reportedly stated that China had the power to make the dollar collapse (if it chose to do so) by liquidating large portions of its U.S. Treasury securities holdings if the United States imposed trade sanctions to force an appreciation of the RMB, and that the threat to do so could be used as a “bargaining chip.” Ding Gang, a senior editor with China’s People’s Daily, wrote in an editorial in August 2011 that China should directly link the amount of U.S. Treasury holdings with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, stating that “now is the time for China to use its ‘financial weapon’ to teach the United States a lesson if it moves forward with a plan to sale arms to Taiwan. In fact, China has never wanted to use its holdings of U.S. debt as a weapon. It is the United States that is forcing it to do so ... to defend itself when facing threats to China's sovereignty.”4
Tóm tắt là TQ nó biết trước nó phụ thuộc cực kì nặng nề vào ngành chip của Mỹ, cho nên thằng TQ đầu tư 1 số lượng cực lớn vào US assets để nắm gân Mỹ đế, TQ nó đe dọa sẽ cho đồng Đô la Mỹ sụp đổ bằng cách cho bốc hơi 1 số lượng cực lớn US assets nếu Mỹ áp đặt các lệnh cấm vận thương mại lên TQ, TQ xem đây như là vũ khí chiến lược để mặc cả về vấn đề chip với Mỹ.
What If China Reduces its Holdings of U.S. Securities?
A potentially serious short-term problem would emerge if China decided to suddenly reduce their liquid U.S. financial assets significantly. The effect could be compounded if this action triggered a more general financial reaction (or panic), in which all foreigners responded by reducing their holdings of U.S. assets. The initial effect could be a sudden and large depreciation in the value of the dollar, as the supply of dollars on the foreign exchange market increased, and a sudden and large increase in U.S. interest rates, as an important funding source for investment and the budget deficit was withdrawn from the financial markets. The dollar depreciation by itself would not cause a recession since it would ultimately lead to a trade surplus (or smaller deficit), which expands aggregate demand.59 (Empirical evidence suggests that the full effects of a change in the exchange rate on traded goods take time, so the dollar may have to “overshoot” its eventual depreciation level in order to achieve a significant adjustment in trade flows in the short run.)60 However, a sudden increase in interest rates could swamp the trade effects and cause (or worsen) a recession. Large increases in interest rates could cause problems for the U.S. economy, as these increases reduce the market value of debt securities, causing prices on the stock market to fall, undermining efficient financial intermediation, and jeopardizing the solvency of various debtors and creditors. Resources may not be able to shift quickly enough from interest-sensitive sectors to export sectors to make this transition fluid. The Federal Reserve could mitigate the interest rate spike by reducing short-term interest rates, although this reduction would influence long-term rates only indirectly, and could worsen the dollar depreciation and increase inflation. In March 2007, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke reportedly stated in a letter to Senator Shelby that “because foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities represent only a small part of total U.S. credit market debt outstanding, U.S. credit markets should be able to absorb without great difficulty any shift of foreign allocations.”61
De-Sinicization (de + Sinicization) is a process of eliminating or reducing Chinese cultural elements, identity, or consciousness from a society or nation. In modern contexts, it is often used in tandem with decolonization and contrasted to the assimilation process of Sinicization.
‘De-Sinicization’ and Manufacturing in China
Một cái nhìn về các xu hướng ảnh hưởng đến nền kinh tế lớn thứ hai của thế giới
Trung Quốc đang đối mặt với một thách thức kinh tế khi xu hướng "de-sinicization" hay việc loại bỏ hoặc tiêu diệt văn hóa Trung Quốc đang được thực hiện trên chuỗi cung ứng toàn cầu. "Các công ty trên toàn thế giới dự kiến sẽ thay đổi chuỗi cung ứng của họ để ít phụ thuộc hơn vào Trung Quốc sau đại dịch COVID-19," theo một bài báo gần đây trên The Diplomat.
‘De-Sinicization’ and Manufacturing in China | Maryland Smith
How will de-sinicization and the new challenges in manufacturing change the world's second-largest economy?Năm 2010, viện nghiên cứu chiến lược Hoa Kì đã đặt ra nhiều vấn đề liên quan mật thiết đến việc: TQ hiện tại đang nắm quá nhiều US assets, quốc hội hoa kì có nhờ hội thinktank của quốc hội nghiên cứu vấn đề này để tìm ra đối sách phù hợp cho TQ, CRS ( Congressional Research Service ) đã trình bày với quốc hội hoa kì các vấn đề trên như sau:
Ai ko hiểu thì tự gg nhé vì t sẽ trích cả đoạn text luôn cho khỏi mất công đứa nào kêu t xạo lz
China-U.S. Trade Issues Wayne M. Morrison Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance July 29, 2010
China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities in the Context of Global Imbalances Many economists argue that concerns over China’s holdings of U.S. securities represent part of a broader problem related to “global imbalances” – the concept that large differences in saving and investment between countries have manifested itself in large trade imbalances. For the U.S. economy, this issue is manifested namely in its low savings rate and thus its dependence on foreign saving to finance its investment needs and federal budget deficits. The large U.S. current account deficit (the manifestation of the high U.S. saving/investment gap) cannot be sustained indefinitely because the U.S. net foreign debt cannot rise faster than GDP indefinitely. The U.S. current account deficit as a percent of GDP fell from a peak of 6.0% in 2006 to 2.7% in 2009 (largely due to the effects of the global economic slowdown). It rose to 3.0% in 2010 and has remained around that level through 2012. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that this figure will fall to 2.9% in 2013, but then will rise over the next five years, reaching 3.5% by 2018 (still significantly below its historical peak).62 In that light, a move by China to a more flexible currency and capital control policy would reduce the Chinese government’s need to purchase U.S. securities (notably, Treasury securities), but could result in greater private Chinese investment in U.S. securities (notably, private securities). Some economists warn that at some point foreign investors may view the growing level of U.S. foreign debt as unsustainable or more risky, or they may no longer view U.S. securities as offering the best return on their investment, and shift investment funds away from U.S. assets, thus forcing U.S. interest rates to rise to attract needed foreign capital. This could result in higher interest rates and lower investment rates, all else equal, which could reduce long-term growth.63 A reliance on foreign governments such as China, to finance the U.S. current account deficit (which includes the U.S. merchandise trade deficit) by increasing their foreign exchange reserves may prolong the necessary adjustment process. Thus, it is argued, the United States must boost its level of savings in the long run in order to reduce its vulnerability to a potential shift away from U.S. assets by foreign investors. It remains to be seen whether this adjustment process began in the United States in 2008, or whether the rise in private saving and decline in the current account deficit was only a temporary response to the recession. Some economists contend that, although the low U.S. savings rate is a problem, the U.S. current account deficit and high levels of foreign capital flows to the United States are also reflections of the strength of the U.S. economy and its attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment, and therefore discount the likelihood that foreign investors will suddenly shift their capital elsewhere.6
Many U.S. policymakers have raised concern over China’s large and growing holdings of U.S. securities, stating that, while such purchases have contributed to the ability of the United States meet its investment needs and have helped fund the growing U.S. federal budget deficit (thus helping to keep real U.S. interest rates low), they could give China increased leverage over the United States on major bilateral political and economic issues.24 In the 111th Congress, H.R. 5319 and S. 3240 would seek to increase the transparency regarding U.S. debt instruments held by foreign governments (including China—the largest foreign holder) to better assess the risks such holdings may have to the United States. Others counter that, given China’s economic dependency on a stable and growing U.S. economy, and its substantial holdings of U.S. securities, any attempt to try to “dump” a large share of those holdings would likely damage both the U.S. and Chinese economies; it would also likely reduce the value of China’s remaining holdings of U.S. dollar assets, and, thus, is not a feasible option for China.
Tóm tắt ý chính thì mấy ông này phân tích là TQ- Hoa Kì quan hệ từ 2009-2010 có sự gắn kết rất bền chặt cả về nợ công quốc gia sở hữu lẫn đầu tư trực tiếp nước ngoài, cho nên là việc TQ bán tháo phần lớn US assets sở hữu sẽ làm thiệt hại cả 2 nền kinh tế Mỹ - Trung, cho nên là viễn cảnh đó khó xảy ra .
Năm 2013, cũng hội think tank đó có suy nghĩ khác như thế này:
China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications for the U.S. Economy
Concerns over China’s Large Holdings of U.S. Securities The growing U.S. dependency on China to purchase U.S. Treasury securities to help fund the U.S. budget deficit has become a major concern to many U.S. policymakers. Some have raised concerns that China’s large holdings may give it leverage over the United States on economic as well as noneconomic issues. Others have expressed concern that China might lose faith in the ability of the United States to meet its debt obligations, and, thus, might seek to liquidate such assets or significantly cut back on purchases of new securities, a move some contend could damage the U.S. economy. Still others contend that China’s purchases of U.S. securities were a major contributing factor to the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis and subsequent global economic slowdown because such purchases helped to keep real U.S. interest rates very low and increased global imbalances. Some warn that similar bubbles could occur in the future if imbalances between the United States and China are not addressed.33 Chinese officials, on the other hand, have expressed concerns over the safety of their large holdings of U.S. debt, and some have argued that China should either diversify away from U.S. Treasury securities or implement policies that slow the accumulation of FX reserves, which would lessen the need to buy U.S. assets.
Some Chinese officials in the past have suggested that its holdings of U.S. debt could be used in regard to economic and political disputes with the United States. To illustrate, an August 7, 2007, article in the Telegraph (an online British newspaper) cited interviews with officials from two leading Chinese government think tanks who reportedly stated that China had the power to make the dollar collapse (if it chose to do so) by liquidating large portions of its U.S. Treasury securities holdings if the United States imposed trade sanctions to force an appreciation of the RMB, and that the threat to do so could be used as a “bargaining chip.” Ding Gang, a senior editor with China’s People’s Daily, wrote in an editorial in August 2011 that China should directly link the amount of U.S. Treasury holdings with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, stating that “now is the time for China to use its ‘financial weapon’ to teach the United States a lesson if it moves forward with a plan to sale arms to Taiwan. In fact, China has never wanted to use its holdings of U.S. debt as a weapon. It is the United States that is forcing it to do so ... to defend itself when facing threats to China's sovereignty.”4
Tóm tắt là TQ nó biết trước nó phụ thuộc cực kì nặng nề vào ngành chip của Mỹ, cho nên thằng TQ đầu tư 1 số lượng cực lớn vào US assets để nắm gân Mỹ đế, TQ nó đe dọa sẽ cho đồng Đô la Mỹ sụp đổ bằng cách cho bốc hơi 1 số lượng cực lớn US assets nếu Mỹ áp đặt các lệnh cấm vận thương mại lên TQ, TQ xem đây như là vũ khí chiến lược để mặc cả về vấn đề chip với Mỹ.
What If China Reduces its Holdings of U.S. Securities?
A potentially serious short-term problem would emerge if China decided to suddenly reduce their liquid U.S. financial assets significantly. The effect could be compounded if this action triggered a more general financial reaction (or panic), in which all foreigners responded by reducing their holdings of U.S. assets. The initial effect could be a sudden and large depreciation in the value of the dollar, as the supply of dollars on the foreign exchange market increased, and a sudden and large increase in U.S. interest rates, as an important funding source for investment and the budget deficit was withdrawn from the financial markets. The dollar depreciation by itself would not cause a recession since it would ultimately lead to a trade surplus (or smaller deficit), which expands aggregate demand.59 (Empirical evidence suggests that the full effects of a change in the exchange rate on traded goods take time, so the dollar may have to “overshoot” its eventual depreciation level in order to achieve a significant adjustment in trade flows in the short run.)60 However, a sudden increase in interest rates could swamp the trade effects and cause (or worsen) a recession. Large increases in interest rates could cause problems for the U.S. economy, as these increases reduce the market value of debt securities, causing prices on the stock market to fall, undermining efficient financial intermediation, and jeopardizing the solvency of various debtors and creditors. Resources may not be able to shift quickly enough from interest-sensitive sectors to export sectors to make this transition fluid. The Federal Reserve could mitigate the interest rate spike by reducing short-term interest rates, although this reduction would influence long-term rates only indirectly, and could worsen the dollar depreciation and increase inflation. In March 2007, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke reportedly stated in a letter to Senator Shelby that “because foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities represent only a small part of total U.S. credit market debt outstanding, U.S. credit markets should be able to absorb without great difficulty any shift of foreign allocations.”61
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